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Abstract
Why and how does a risk, once accepted, raise a political problem in a way that affects 
the consequence of a policy? To answer these questions, this article focuses on the 
interactive change of political context and risk perception. A changing political context 
may develop a gap in risk perception among actors and vice versa. This gap distorts 
the initial consensus on risk acceptance, affecting the consequence of policy; here, 
this process is referred to as the politicization of risk. Applying this perspective, this 
article examines the process in which the A-12 aircraft acquisition program of the U.S. 
Navy was adopted as policy but eventually terminated due to technical and political 
mismanagement of risk. The analysis indicates that risk propensity is influenced not 
only by personality and political institutions as some scholars point out, but is also 
changed by an interaction between political context and actors’ perception. In the case 
of the A-12 program, a perception gap between the executive and legislative branches 
caused a politicization of risk and consolidated a risk-averse context, which led to the 
termination of the program.
Keywords: risk, politicization, perception gap, policy trilemma, military acquisition
要旨
政治過程において一旦受け入れられたリスクは、なぜ、いかにして政治的問題
を提起し、政策の帰結に影響を与えるようになるのか。本稿ではこの問題を、
アクターのリスク認識と政治的コンテクストが相互作用的に変化する過程に着
目することで明らかにしていく。この過程において生じる認識ギャップは、リ
スク受容について当初形成されたコンセンサスを歪める。その結果、一旦は潜
在化したリスクをめぐる政治論争が再燃し、政策そのものにも変更を迫ること
になる（本稿ではこれを、リスクの「政治化」と呼ぶ）。本稿ではこのような
観点から、米国海軍のA-12艦載攻撃機開発プログラムの事例を分析し、リス
クをめぐる行政府、立法府間の認識ギャップがリスク問題の再検討を促した結
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果、リスクを嫌忌する政治的コンテクストが強化され、高い軍事的要請にもか
かわらずプログラムが中止されるに至った経緯を明らかにしている。
キーワード：リスク、　政治化、　認識ギャップ、　政策のトリレンマ、　軍事調達
Introduction
Risk management in public policy-making is a theme of increasing importance 
particularly at a time when risk consciousness is boosted under ﬁscal pressure. Budget 
reduction, with the cost growth of public policy, forces policy-makers to reallocate 
ﬁnancial resources, leading to the redistribution of risk. This possibly raises political 
controversies on risk: what types of risk should be accepted (or not), and how that risk 
should be managed in order to achieve policy objectives. These controversies emerge 
even in foreign and security policy, which seems to be determined more directly by 
external factors including balance of power or threat from other nations, especially in 
the realist paradigm. In fact, risk has been, both theoretically and practically, considered 
as an important component of decision-making in foreign and security policy (Mintz 
and DeRouen Jr. 2010: 28; Conybeare 1992; Morrow 1987; Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 
while the effort to theorize the politics of risk is considered unsatisfactory because of its 
ambiguous deﬁnition (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008: 147).
Risk is not only ubiquitous in public policy but is also subjective, often increasing 
the gaps in perception and in interpretation among actors. Once a decision is made 
through a process where some kind of risk is widely recognized, there also must be a 
consensus for accepting or avoiding that risk as a result of political coordination. But 
such a risk, even if once accepted, often becomes highly controversial later and the 
decision is changed. As Vetzberger suggests, risk preferences are not cold cognitions 
that just happen as a calculated rational outcome, but evolve (1995: 375). Even in 
military acquisition, which is carried out through a more highly-institutionalized risk 
management system than other domains of security policy such as alliance and foreign 
intervention, actors’ attitudes toward risk often change in different ways. Consequently, in 
spite of its inertia (Russett 1983: 92), acquisition programs that are supported at the beginning 
are often cut back or terminated due to risk, even without a change in strategic requirements.
This article addresses why and how a risk once accepted raises political controversy 
in a way that changes the status quo policy. To answer this question the first section 
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reviews matters of risk and risk perception in the context of several traditional 
approaches to foreign policy-making and presents an approach referred to as a 
politicization of risk. The following sections attempt to empirically illustrate the 
process of how risk once accepted becomes politically controversial and affects the 
policy outcome, by examining the case of the U.S. A-12 acquisition program, which 
had been strongly supported but eventually terminated because of increasing risk-
averseness in Congress.
1. Rethinking risk in security policy
In managing risks of military acquisition, strategic factors such as threat and military 
capability, which scholars of security studies have often treated as significant to 
understand the mechanism of military build-up, obviously play an important part 
(Brooks 1975: 77; Waltz 1979: 127; Koubi 1999). In turn, measures of risk assessment 
and management are relatively institutionalized, especially in the U.S. The Department 
of Defense (2006) deﬁnes the concept of risk as “a measure of future uncertainties in 
achieving program performance goals and objectives within deﬁned cost, schedule and 
performance constraints”. Risk is broken down into the following three components: 
root cause, probability, and consequence (Department of Defense 2006: 1). Risk 
calculation based on this conceptualization contributes to the systematic management 
of risk in military acquisition. If we focus on these features, it is possible to presume 
that an attitude toward risk is rationally decided in terms of strategic requirements and 
implemented through standard operational procedure (Alison 1999).
On the contrary, there are complicated considerations in the actual acquisition planning. 
Maximizing military performance of a given weapon system is not always the best 
option because it generally means higher costs, longer schedules and an increased risk 
of failure (Mayer and Khademian 1996: 186). Furthermore, the validity of a program’s 
goal is possibly determined in broader and multiple policy contexts. In practice, various 
factors including technological uncertainty, budgetary pressure and industrial capacity 
are taken into account in the acquisition process. Above all, technological uncertainty 
tends to have a non-negligible impact on risk management, with inevitable risks of cost 
overrun, schedule slippage, or lack of planned military capability (Sapolsky, Gholz, 
and Talmadge 2009: 84). These factors are relevant in the context not only of military 
strategy but of ﬁscal and industrial policy, often posing a dilemma, or in some cases, a 
trilemma. Thus, a decision may reﬂect the consequence of political adjustment among 
several conﬂicting policy objectives and measures.
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Such a conﬂict often appears in the decision-making of U.S. security policy, which is 
characterized by democracy and the distribution of power (Sarkesian, Williams, and 
Cimbala 2008: 49-64). If we focus on this dimension of the U.S. decision-making 
process, it may be more appropriate to adopt the “governmental model” (Alison 1999), 
though it is necessary to take into account the strong inﬂuence of Congress especially 
in the budgetary process, which will be the focus of this article (Lindsay 1992/1993; 
Hilsman 1958). The executive branch including the DoD (Department of Defense) and, 
in some cases, the military services, plans a strategy and presents a budget request to 
Congress.1 In turn, the support of Congress is decisively important because Congress 
decides the actual amount of budget by referring to the administration’s plan. Indeed, 
the governmental model could more accurately reflect the reality of acquisition as 
described in a study on the V-22, Osprey, acquisition program (Jones 2001).
But at the same time, it is clear that this perspective, which sees policy-making as the 
consequence of a political tug of war, is not enough to understand the mechanism of 
political reactivation of risk problems. When a decision is made, this means that politics 
among actors ended with some sort of consensus, reﬂecting their power relationship, 
interests, or influence of the institution. In other words, the first step to explain a 
decision’s reactivation is to examine why that consensus broke down. In terms of 
military acquisition, there is often a growing perception gap among actors whereas the 
conceptualization of the DoD suggests that the risk of military acquisition is seemingly 
assessed and systematically managed in an objective way. Often, a risk once accepted, 
subsequently causes serious political conﬂict and leads to policy change.
In dealing with the perception of actors, some scholars highlight the psychological 
dimension of their behavior and argue that decision-making is likely to be influenced 
by perception and processing of information (Jervis 1976; De Rivera 1968; Mintz and 
DeRouen Jr. 2010). In a recent research study, Welch, referring to a wide variety of 
literature including organization theory, psychological theory, and prospect theory, presents 
a model for foreign policy change by focusing on the influence of state characteristics 
and ‘reference point’ as a basis for understanding how leaders frame the gains or losses 
of a policy. Such perspectives, though developed in the broad context of foreign policy, 
are relatively similar to analyzing the change of risk perception, which is almost a matter 
of how actors accept or avoid risk by, even though subjectively, calculating the balance 
between gains and losses to optimize or prioritize multiple policy objectives.
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Then, what factors determine, and more importantly in this article, change risk 
perception and propensity? So far, in addition to the above-mentioned scholars 
suggesting the importance of decision makers’ perception, the theorization of risk in 
foreign and security policy studies has also been developed to a certain extent. Some 
consider the degree of democracy as a factor correlated with a state’s risk propensity. 
According to Weitsman and Shambaugh (2001), democratic countries tend to make 
risk-averse decisions regardless of strategic context. Other scholars, highlighting the 
individual level, emphasize the political leader’s character or perception in foreign 
policy decision-making (Kowert and Hermann 1997). Taliaferro (2004) suggests that, 
based on prospect theory, national leaders’ ways to process information and select options 
provide a better explanation for national attitudes toward risk in military interventions in 
the peripheral regions, than the anarchical structure of the international system.
However, these approaches highlighting relatively static factors such as personality and 
political institution, while being useful to understand a tendency for risk acceptance, 
are not sufficient to explain the change of risk perception in a policy process. To 
understand this point, it is necessary not only to explain how decision-makers’ risk 
perception is determined, but also to address why it changes and leads to perception 
gaps that spawn political controversy on risk.
By taking into account the interaction between political context and risk perception, 
this article attempts to explain how risk interpretation changes and develops into a 
difference in actors’ attitudes toward risk. On the one hand, a change in the political 
context causes a gap in risk perception among actors involved in a policy process. On 
the other hand, the perception gap on risk caused by difference in a wide variety of 
related issues including security, economic, industrial, and budgetary forecasts, and 
asymmetrical information may change the political context. In this interactive process, 
the change in risk interpretation distorts the initial consensus on risk acceptance 
and causes leaders to reconsider the priority of policy objectives in a dilemma or 
a trilemma. Thus, the change of risk interpretation (re)activates political friction 
and affects the consequence of policy (in this article this process is referred to as 
politicization of risk), in spite of the consensus they once reached.
To examine the matter of risk in certain political contexts, we shall deal with a less 
abstract case as this can better reflect the specific political environment and national 
security issues that an individual state can face. This study examines the case of 
the A-12 acquisition program, in which the U.S. intended to develop a new naval 
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stealth aircraft but which stirred up serious political controversy on the acceptability 
of risk at the end of the 1980s. This means that the case selected is set in relatively 
risk-tolerant conditions in political terms for the following reasons: the U.S. has a 
highly technology-oriented strategic culture (Adamsky 2010: 85-87);2 and the actors 
involved in the U.S. acquisition process tend to accept risk and immature technology 
(Else III 2008: 181). In some cases, aggressive risk-taking is recommended from 
outside the government (Birkler 2010: 21-29). Particularly in the late 1980s, the U.S., 
experiencing the transformation of international threat and severe fiscal pressure, 
shifted to an acquisition strategy which depended more on R&D (research and 
development) with technological uncertainty. What is equally important is the feature 
of the U.S. acquisition process to manage the risk once taken.3 These attitudes toward 
risk in developing military technology seem to be an important part of the background 
of the U.S. technological superiority since the end of the Cold War (Wohlforth 1999; 
Posen 2003; Paarlberg 2004; Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2011).
Despite these features of the U.S. acquisition policy, the A-12 development, which 
was one of the top priority programs in the Navy’s aviation planning in the late 1980s, 
was eventually terminated. This consequence resulted not only from substantial cost 
growth, schedule slippage, and technical performance shortfalls, which similarly arose 
in many other R&D programs including the Advanced Tactical Fighter (F-22), the V-22, 
and the B-2 which were subsequently completed, rather, it stemmed from mounting 
concern over risk management through the budgetary process.4 The following sections 
examine why and how the risk in the A-12 development program was politicized in these 
risk-tolerant conditions.
2. Risk perception and policy trilemma of the A-12 program
The A-12 program, a new advanced stealth aircraft which was of high requirement in 
military strategy, faced a serious policy trilemma with the change in the ﬁscal and military 
environments. The U.S. defense community acutely reviewed what types of risk should 
be or should not be taken to optimize conﬂicting policy objectives in the A-12 acquisition 
process. The military purpose of the A-12 program planned during the mid-1980s was to 
replace the aging and obsolete A-6(E) naval medium attack aircraft ﬂeet, which had been 
operated by the Navy and the Marine Corps. This replacement was intended to enhance 
the power projection capability and the survivability of naval aircraft. In the same way, the 
Air Force planned to acquire a variant of the A-12 in order to strengthen long-range air-to-
land attack capability, and was cooperating with the project (Carlucci 1989: 160).
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The actual replacement was scheduled for the 1990s. As an interim measure, the DoD 
planned to procure the A-6F, an upgraded version of the A-6E, to consistently enhance 
naval aviation capability. But in ﬁscal year 1988 Congress did not authorize spending 
for the A-6F, hence the DoD decided to implement a limited modiﬁcation of the A-6E. 
This measure was considered as a temporary expedient until the A-6E could be replaced 
with the A-12 (Weinberger 1986: 205; Weinberger 1987: 195; Carlucci 1988: 209).
But this budgeting increasingly prompted the administration to take a risky option, which 
led to subsequent controversy on risk management. Concerning the quantitative shortage 
of the A-6, the DoD and the Navy placed a greater emphasis on the development of the 
A-12. The DoD even proposed a plan to invest in the A-12 by cutting spending for an 
additional procurement of the A-6. Similarly, the Navy, in the congressional hearings in 
1989, also insisted that the A-12 would not only solve the problem of aircraft shortage 
but also enhance the attack capability of carrier battle groups, hence it was one of the top 
priority programs along with the Aegis system and a new submarine that would be the 
basis of future military capability planning (HASC 1989a: 952, 982).
It is also important to note that the A-12 program could still be justiﬁed in the context 
of the Cold War strategy at that time. Richard B. Chaney, Secretary of Defense, clearly 
argued that the development of the A-12 must be continued so as to compete with the 
Soviet Union even under ﬁscal pressure forcing the cancellation of various programs 
(SASC 1989b: 32). Likewise, the Navy also justiﬁed the requirement of carrier battle 
groups in terms of the Soviet threat, and suggested to Congress to replace the A-6 
with the A-12 at a ratio of one to one. This demand was based on the outlook that the 
capability of the A-6 would be increasingly insufficient in the mid-1990s because of 
the revitalization of the Soviet Union (SASC 1989a: 240-241).
In turn, Congress also agreed to the military importance of the A-12. At the same 
time, however, there was concern for the measure proposed by the administration. 
If Congress decided to reduce the procurement quantity of conventional aircraft to 
reallocate the budget to the A-12 development, the solution of naval aircraft shortage 
depended on whether the A-12 development would succeed or not. Congress perceived 
this situation as highly risky because such a measure was based on a technologically 
uncertain assumption that would escalate the aircraft shortage if the program had 
any problems (SASC 1989b: 361-362; HASC 1989a: 1027-1028). In fact, some 
congressmen expressed concern about the shortage of the A-6E and the closure of its 
production line before completing development of the new aircraft (SASC 1989d: 387-388; 
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SASC 1989c: 249). But if aggressively investing both in the A-12 development and in 
the production of conventional aircraft to reduce military risk, it would make it difﬁcult 
to achieve the objective of the ﬁscal policy at that time, i.e. a reduction of the deﬁcit. In 
short, Congress faced a trilemma of three conﬂicting policy objectives: maintaining short-
term capability, preparing for long-term military threat, and achieving ﬁscal soundness.
However, the DoD plan did not anticipate such a trilemma because it was based on a 
slightly different evaluation of program status. The DoD and the Navy argued that it 
was possible to maintain the required capability by modifying and cautiously operating 
existing aircraft. In other words, the executive branch perceived that it was possible to 
accept the short term risk caused by the reduction of procurement quantity in order to 
save costs. This proposal was based on a more optimistic evaluation of the progress of 
the A-12 program which led to the expectation that the replacement of naval aircraft 
would be implemented on time (SASC 1989d: 387-388; SASC 1989c: 249).
Congress, however, maintained a cautious stance toward the proposal. The Armed 
Services Committees of both the House and the Senate approved the funding of the 
A-12 development program while withholding judgment whether they would cancel 
the procurement program of the existing type of aircraft. In the Committee report, the 
Senate expressed concern over the serious shortage of naval aviation capability and 
the overuse of aircraft in operation (SASC 1989e: 46). The conclusion of Congress 
was intended neither to deny the importance of the A-12 itself, nor to criticize the 
administration’s effort to reconstruct naval aviation capability around the A-12. Rather, 
Congress questioned, with the premise to complete the acquisition of the A-12, the 
problem of how to evaluate and manage the risk that could emerge in the program. 
Consequently, Congress, facing a policy trilemma, decided to avoid military risk by 
setting aside the budgetary purpose at least in ﬁscal year 1989. In other words, whereas 
the risk perception between the administration and the legislature had already been 
slightly different, the latter considered it to be manageable.
3. Politicization of risk in the budgetary process
In the budgetary process of fiscal year 1990, it was a more urgent task to solve the 
naval aircraft shortage under increasingly heightened fiscal pressure. Although the 
Navy continued to explain that it was necessary to modernize the A-6 in the short 
term, it was still extremely interested in replacing it with the A-12 in the long term 
(HASC 1990a: 5, 18). The Navy and the Air Force expressed little concern as to the 
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A-12 development, and instead presented its progress as smooth. Additionally, in March 1990, 
they confirmed that the program cost would not increase (HASC 1990a: 101). The official 
line was that both budgetary and military risks of the A-12 development still remained low.
In late April, a congressional hearing was held to discuss the Major Aircraft Review 
(MAR) that the DoD had conducted. Although the DoD revealed a plan to reduce the 
overall procurement quantity of the A-12 and to postpone the procurement schedule 
of the Air Force version, Congress did not show much concern about this measure 
(SASC 1990a: 781-783). In the subsequent hearing held in May, while showing 
the estimate that the acquisition cost would swell due to the reduction in overall 
procurement quantity, the Navy insisted that the A-12 still remained the top priority 
program because the existing aircraft was neither financially feasible nor militarily 
satisfactory. The background to this contention was that the Navy’s program evaluation 
was still optimistic at that time. Richard M. Dunleavy, Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations, stated that he had been informed of the program status at the production 
line of McDonnell Douglas, one of the contractors of the A-12, and evaluated that the 
progress of the development was satisfactory (SASC 1990b: 164-165, 186). From the 
Navy’s standpoint based on such recognition, the risk of the A-12 program was not so 
serious and the cost overrun of the program was expected to be offset, in the long run, 
by the expected efﬁciency of the deployment phase.
By this time, however, the A-12 program had such severe problems that it had to be 
cancelled. In June, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics, the prime contractor, 
informed the Navy that the first flight schedule would be seriously delayed, that the 
development cost would swell and exceed the contractors’ capacity, and that the 
speciﬁcations required in the contract could not be fulﬁlled. At congressional request, 
in July, the Navy started to investigate the program to find out the cause of the 
difference between the actual progress and the information that was given in the MAR.5
The Committee report for the ﬁscal year 1991 was written in the midst of increasing 
skepticism toward the risk of the program. The Senate Armed Services Committee 
pointed out that not only a technical problem of overweight was not ﬁxed but that even 
the required capability was not fulfilled. These concerns led to further questions on 
spending for the procurement of the A-12 included in the budget request because of the 
acquisition principle ‘fly before buy’ which requires the completion of development 
and the test of a prototype before starting production (SASC 1990c: 26-27).6 Congress, 
facing the end of the Cold War, increasingly began to criticize the kind of program 
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management that necessitates additional investment to fix technical problems after 
deployment. Therefore, it was unacceptable for Congress to provide procurement 
spending for the A-12 with its substantial uncertainties, which deviated from the 
acquisition principle (SASC 1990c: 53).
Similarly, the report by the House Armed Services Committee required the fulﬁllment 
of the principle of ‘fly before buy’ before making a procurement plan. In addition, 
the House Committee remarked on the difficulty of evaluating highly confidential 
information despite their recognition of problems such as schedule slippage due to the 
ﬁnancial and technical capacity of the contractors. Based on these considerations, the 
Committee recommended cutting 1.15 billion dollars from the requested procurement 
spending for the A-12, and declassifying program information before requesting the 
procurement budget (HASC 1990b: 55).
In terms of risk management, it is also important to note that these concerns for the A-12 
development prompted an additional procurement of conventional aircraft. The Committee 
recommended about 2.3 billion dollars for eighty-four F/A-18s while the administration 
requested about 1.9 billion dollars for sixty-six aircraft. This budget increase was justiﬁed, 
in spite of severe fiscal discipline, due to the fact that the operational capability of the 
existing A-6E was not satisfactory, i.e. seventy percent of the required level, though the 
development programs of two advanced aircraft, the A-12 and the Naval Advanced Tactical 
Fighter, were facing serious schedule slippage and could have been reduced in quantity 
in the future (HASC 1990b: 55-56). In short, the Committee perceived the developmental 
risk as unacceptably high and tried to solve the problem of naval aviation capability by 
procuring existing models, which was a less risky option.
Nonetheless, the spending for the A-12 development was not intensively criticized while 
the procurement spending was deleted. According to Farrell, this program outcome in ﬁscal 
year 1990 can be attributed to the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, which diverted congressional 
concern (1997: 150). Yet, at the same time, the congressional recommendation, regardless 
of the situation in the Middle East, obviously reflected an outlook that the acquisition 
of the A-12 could be completed sooner or later by cautiously managing risk. In fact, the 
conclusion of the Conference Committee required the Navy to fully commit to the A-12 
program and would authorize 554.5 million dollars for the procurement if the development 
in ﬁscal year 1992 made enough progress (HASC 1990c: 425, 531).
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Their recommendations meant that Congress recognized, at their discretion, the risk of 
the program as still manageable while denouncing the optimistic risk evaluation by the 
administration. But at the end of November an investigation report was submitted, and 
then, Lawrence H. Garrett III, Secretary of the Navy, acknowledged the inaccuracy of 
the information the contractors reported in the MAR.7 Subsequently, the administration’s 
management of the A-12 program came to be severely criticized.
In December, the House Subcommittees on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, 
Research and Development, and Investigation held a joint hearing on the A-12 
program. They placed greater emphasis on the limited access right to information, 
which obstructed Congress in comprehending the entire scope of the problem due 
to the administration’s inaccurate risk evaluation, rather than the realized risk itself. 
Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, at the beginning of the 
hearing, raised the issue that the cost and schedule problems were revealed just after 
ﬁve weeks of hearings in April, despite the DoD and the Navy’s explanations that there 
were few problems with the program (HASC 1990d: 1). Ronald V. Dellums, chairman 
of the Research and Development Subcommittee, suggested that the poor performance 
in spite of strong congressional support was a problem beyond the A-12 itself, leading 
to the broader question of how research and development should be managed thereafter 
(HASC 1990d: 2-3). Furthermore, this problem was framed as an institutional ﬂaw of 
the entire acquisition management system (HASC 1990d: 6; HASC 1991b: 429-430).
4. Was the A-12 unnecessary? Unsolved problems and increased risk averseness
On January 7, 1991, the DoD terminated the A-12 program due to contractor failure. It 
was pointed out that the DoD denied the Navy’s demand to continue the program after 
revision because of the cost overrun and the increasing ﬁscal pressure on defense spending 
(Farrell 1997: 153; General Accounting Ofﬁce 1992: 5). But these issues were not speciﬁc 
to the A-12, and all other programs were facing the same problem. In other words, these 
problems were necessary conditions but are insufﬁcient to explain the termination of the 
A-12 program. As described above, the more direct cause was the risk (and the perception 
gap) concerning the serious shortage of naval aircraft by that time. While the program risk 
was accepted at the beginning, it was politicized because of mismanagement.
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In terms of the politicization of risk and its consequence, it is of equal importance to 
note that the policy trilemma was not solved just by program termination. Whereas the 
DoD and the Navy insisted on the adequacy of the termination itself, there was a concern 
that the decision would amplify the insufﬁciency of military capability to implement 
the post-Cold War military strategy (HASC 1991a: 60; SASC 1991a: 140). The Air 
Force was also concerned about its impact on the construction plan of next generation 
forces and began advocating the resumption of the program (HASC 1991c: 474; 
SASC 1991b: 52). Moreover, the lessons learned from the Gulf War, such as the 
effectiveness of stealth aircrafts and the transformation of regional threat, boosted the 
argument that the capability expected for the A-12 would still be vital in the post-Cold 
War strategy (HASC 1991d: 65, 68). For the advocates, the successor aircraft to the 
A-6 would need to be equipped with capabilities for night and all-weather operations, 
have a well-balanced payload and operational range, and stealth capability in order 
to be able to confront future threat with an increasingly enhanced air defense system 
(HASC 1991d: 65-66). These features are precisely what the A-12 would have, and its 
termination meant that there was an emerging gap between the new military strategy 
and the necessary capability to implement it.
The lack of necessary capability forced the administration to rebuild the naval aviation 
programs. Two key options were proposed. The first one was to maintain capability 
by modifying existing aircraft such as the A-6 and the F/A-18. The second was to start 
the AX, a new stealth aircraft development program, by reallocating the budget of the 
terminated A-12 program. The Navy demanded a mixed plan, which carried on the 
development of a new aircraft to replace the A-6 in the future, while upgrading the F/A-18 
to the F/A-18E/F as an interim measure. The Navy seemed to perceive that only the AX 
could be effective to maintain future naval capability. But just after the failure of the 
A-12 program, the development of a new stealth aircraft was unlikely to be completed 
in the immediate. In fact, the Navy forecast that full scale development of the A-12, 
even if it had started, would be completed in 2003 or 2004 (HASC 1991d: 82, 87; 
SASC 1991c: 116). Modernization of existing aircraft was demanded to complement 
the lack of capability accrued by that time.
Similarly, Congress agreed to the termination of the A-12 program in spite of an aircraft 
shortage which would increase military risk (HASC 1991d: 64; SASC: 1991c: 106-107). 
Nonetheless, Congress could not support the Navy’s plan unconditionally, for it 
doubted the forecast concerning the AX development due to the failure of the A-12. 
In addition, under the policy trend of restoring ﬁscal discipline, both Armed Services 
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Committees attempted to avoid duplication of parallel programs. Put another way, the 
termination of the A-12 placed Congress, as well as the Navy and the DoD, before 
a more severe trilemma among fiscal and military risks. Indeed, the Armed Services 
Committees perceived that their recommendation to cancel or to shrink various 
programs due to ﬁscal policy would lead to a militarily inadequate reduction of naval 
aircraft (HASC 1991d: 91-92).8 As William L. Dickinson in the House Armed Services 
Committee also pointed out, the doubt concerning the AX program was directed to the 
feasibility of the AX program rather than its military requirement since the termination 
of the A-12 development was due to ﬁnancial and technical capacity (HASC 1991d: 81).
The Navy’s AX, naturally, was not planned to fulfill the requirement as much as 
that expected for the A-12. On the one hand, the technology acquired from the A-12 
development was considered to be commensurate with the size of the investment, 
and it was obviously important to apply it to the development of the AX as much 
as possible so as not to incur sunk costs (HASC 1991b: 396). On the other hand, 
with the experience of the A-12 development, the AX program was required to 
include a measure to enhance feasibility, while harnessing accumulated technology. 
Whereas there was criticism by Congress that the Navy’s demand would not match 
the technological level at the time (HASC 1991d: 84), the Navy explained that the 
planned capability of the AX was subject to be degraded in balancing payload, stealth 
capability and operational range (HASC 1991d: 84-85; SASC 1991c: 121). As the 
Navy repeatedly insisted, the AX would not be another A-12 (HASC 1991d: 85, 94). 
Rhetorically, at least, the AX was supposed to be a well balanced and a highly feasible 
program with lower developmental risks.
However, Congress was motivated by a sense of mistrust caused by the failure of the 
A-12. Consequently, in spite of the Navy’s effort to reduce risks, some members of 
Congress preferred to invest in the F/A-18 procurement, which entailed lower risks 
and was satisfactory in quantitative terms compared to the AX (SASC 1991c: 86; 
HASC 1991d: 91-92, 106). In contrast to the trend of shrinking military risk due to the 
end of the Cold War which accelerated many R&D programs, the plan to switch from 
the A-12 to the AX was rather inﬂuenced by the short term capability shortage and risk 
averseness heightened by the A-12 failure.
As described above, the risk issue once highly politicized in the budgetary process 
fostered a risk-averse situation, hence risk management was considered as a much 
more serious problem. While authorizing AX program spending, the House Armed 
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Services Committee additionally specified concerns of risk management failure due 
to the limited information access right of the A-12 program, and recommended not to 
limit access for the new program in so far as possible (HASC 1991e: 15, 41). In turn, 
whereas the Senate Committee also agreed to implement the AX program based on the 
view that the termination of the A-12 would erode the core of the modernization plan of 
naval aviation, they attempted to disperse the risk with development by transferring the 
R&D budget of the Navy to the procurement account for the existing A-6 modiﬁcation 
and an additional procurement of the F/A-18 (SASC 1991d: 22, 65-66).
The Conference Committee reconfirmed these concerns on program feasibility and 
information access rights, and added a clause to the ﬁnal draft of the authorization bill 
to prohibit classiﬁcation of the cost and schedule information of the AX. In addition, as 
the Senate Committee recommended, the budget transfer from the R&D account to other 
aircraft procurement programs was authorized.9 This less risky budgeting reflected the 
Committees’ risk averseness raised by the A-12 program. This experience continued to 
inﬂuence planning of the AX development and overall naval aviation management.
Conclusion and implications
Risk propensity is influenced not only by personality and political institutions as 
some scholars point out. Nor is it static. This article showed that it is changed by an 
interaction between political context and actors’ perception. As a result, it develops 
into a perception gap leading to risk politicization. The controversy over the A-12 
development and subsequent process indicate the factors inducing risk politicization 
are as put forward below.
First, the A-12 program was prone to gather attention in the political process because 
its military requirement was ‘too high’. The U.S. was working toward the revision of its 
long-term military strategy in reaction to the reduction of Soviet threat and increasing 
fiscal pressure. In spite of these trends, the plan to rebuild naval aviation capability 
around the A-12 tended to be framed as a matter of both short-term risk management 
and long-term military strategy because of the concern of aging and quantitative 
shortage of naval aircraft.
Second, the administration and Congress had different interpretations of risk and 
preferences in management approaches. Although the DoD and the Navy planned 
to build naval capability based on an optimistic evaluation of the A-12 program, 
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Congress, while showing some understanding of its needs, did not necessarily give 
full support to evaluation. This attitude was associated with the matter of risk framing 
described above, leading to congressional action to reduce the short-term risk by 
maintaining procurement spending for existing aircraft.
And ﬁnally, what is most important here is that a perceptional change occurred, which 
in turn accelerated risk politicization. It was obvious that a gap in risk evaluation 
between the branches was initially perceived as manageable at congressional discretion. 
Nonetheless, Congress increasingly criticized the risk management of the A-12 
program due to suspicions of limited information access. Consequently, the decision 
became politically unjustifiable since the risk realized as Congress had expected, 
resulting in the termination of the program and the consolidation of risk averseness in 
subsequent acquisition planning.
In the case of naval aircraft acquisition, all these circumstances stimulated the 
politicization of risk and the consolidation of a risk-averse context. This indicates that 
even the U.S., with a relatively well-institutionalized system for risk management and a 
higher technological and ﬁnancial capacity than any other state, could not easily ignore 
risk as a political matter.
Needless to say, we must be cautious in making generalizations from a conclusion 
derived from a single case study. But there are certain implications if we look at 
current circumstances surrounding the U.S. The U.S. is facing a larger ﬁnancial deﬁcit 
than ever, while simultaneously being urged to reconsider its military strategy both 
in the short and the long term to react against the rapidly rising Chinese threat. Under 
this severe circumstance, a policy trilemma of restoring fiscal discipline, short term 
arrangement of military capability, and preparation for long term threat, may impose 
problems of risk and its politicization in a more general context than in the late 1980s. 
At the same time, similar problems may be unavoidable for other states forced to 
improve their equipment with fewer financial and technological resources. Hence, 
it will be of increasing importance to understand the current international security 
dynamism in terms of risk management and its politicization.
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1 Especially at the end of the Cold War, Lacquement Jr. points out, military leaders could exercise their inﬂuence 
over the arrangement and the doctrine of the military forces due to the lack of a presidential leadership and mass 
public interest (2003: 142).
2 It has also been pointed out that, although the military services tend to be more reluctant to change than other 
actors, they do not necessarily resist technological change while being unwilling to accept a doctrinal one 
(Sapolsky, Gholz, and Talmadge 2009: 22).
3 The matter of program concurrency had been tied to an attitude toward risk management and institutionally 
changed several times during the Cold War (Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 1988: 22-23). And since the late 1990s 
the introduction of Evolutionary Acquisition and Spiral Development methods has been focused in reﬂection of an 
increasingly technology-oriented military acquisition policy in the U.S., for the purpose of risk reduction and rapid 
acquisition of military capabilities (Pagliano and O’Rourke 2004). 
4 A Report of the General Accounting Ofﬁce (1992) brieﬂy describes the process toward the termination of the A-12 program.
5 Memorandum by Chester Paul Beach Jr. for the Secretary of Navy submitted to the hearing on the Navy’s A-12 
Aircraft Program (HASC 1990d: 14).
6 Other programs recommended to be applied this approach include the B-2, the Advanced Tactical Fighter, the 
C-17, and the Missile Experimental (MX) of the Air Force, the V-22 of the Marine Corps, the Light Helicopter 
(LH) of the Army, the SSN-21 of the Navy.
7 Memorandum by Lawrence H. Garrett III for the Secretary of Defense submitted to the hearing on the Navy’s 
A-12 Aircraft Program (HASC 1990d: 9).
8 The similar concern on the inadequate consequence of the congressional action was shared in the Senate 
Committee (SASC 1991c: 87).
9 Public Law 102-190, “NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,” December 5, 1991, Sec. 121, 213.
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